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Abstract
This paper address  the collective identity status in the Late Ottoman period, whit specification on religious’ and national identification of future Turkish, Albanian and Macedonian national projects. Through incorporation of historical facts and study of the modern theories of nationalism we can detect the stages of building the above mentioned proto- nationalisms. Sharing the same institutional contexts in the Ottoman Empire makes similar patterns of late national identity constructions and production of certain aspects of mutual cultural heritage.
The bases of identity are to be seen into the millet system. The transformation of religious into national incorporates both basic models- territorial and ethno- linguistic, but the final national product mainly addresses on the second one. In sense of Turkish identity there is contingent transformation of three powerful ideologies of 19-th century- Pan- Ottomanism, Pan- Islamism and Pan- Turkism whit final product of the modern secular Turkish nation. In the Macedonian example we can also notice three ideological stages- Pan- Orthodoxy, Pan- Slavism and Nationalism in witch in the last be clearly can be noticed Political and Proto- Ethnic stages. The Albanian model example is combination of the previous two national project approaches and generates proto- national, and then national homogeneity through political exploitation of certain ethnic characteristics. We also have to notice that in certain level the first stage of Turkish 19-th century identity (Pan- Ottomanism) was to serve an supra- national, and consequently imposes and to the Christians, and so to the future Albanian and Macedonian proto- nationalisms, and Pan- Islamism can be traced to the Albanian Muslim majority identity, but and the group of future Muslim Macedonians.   
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Arousing of the nation and promoting the national ideology would come up as the key role in redefining the Balkan identities. The new era of modernity is actually offering brand new standards in order to define the Otherness as a requirement to construct the border of groups. While the imperial era, the communities were the ones building the world’s vision through religious systems and servitude as universal criteria, new-fangled conditions of the market economy and citizenship offered the new national country as a sole alternative along with the nationalism as a necessary ideology. 
But in order to homogenize the upcoming national entities, there is a necessity to create mutual criteria for ethnicity that would regardless of the territorial bases or the linguistic-cultural distinctions ought to create a unique ethical awareness or expulsion that would be merely based on the one that is so-called mutual collective memory. Therefore, even during the 19th century the proto-national intelligence would accelerate to establish the ethnical boundaries pursuant the myth of the origin and the durability of the discrepancies. All of this would become an eternal task of the social engineering that would hugely become a task to the creators shaped into the framework of the Balkan historiographies. 
The national project needed necessarily to begin from the religious settlement in the late Ottoman Empire, and generate nowadays Balkan national discourse, which during the clash of the models for building a national ideology were heading from Western Europe. Since the original national ideology under the veil of the liberalism, humanism and the Enlightenment would establish itself into the framework of the Christian communities therefore the ethnicity towards the Orthodox Church would become a basic criterion for building the national originality.  In the early 20th century Pan-Orthodoxy would start its evolution towards the promoting of the Pan-Slavism. The opposition towards the executing of the service of “The Holly Greek Language” becomes the basic motif for the beginning of the search of the medieval empire roots of the Slavic communities. 
This phase continues along with the subsequent transformation while in the middle of the 20th century the Slavic groups begin to construct their own “ethnical boundaries” based on the speech dialect. In addition to that, as long as the Serbian nation creates an institutional frame at first, the Bulgarian proto-nationalism maintains the Pan-Slavic aspect for separation of the Orthodox Greek linguistic ecumenism; hence, the Macedonian example would be equally headed towards the language distinction regarding the Greek at the end of the 19th century while construction the boundaries of the Otherness, but seemingly in terms of the political distinction regarding the Bulgarian and Serbian factor. 
Proto-national elites generated by the citizenships would firstly strive to construct special churches that would further on establish the basic paradigms of the presence of the nation, while representing the secular modern system within the mass education. Hence, at least one generation would be needed to go through the educational institutions in order to conduct the project for creating a homogeneous nation.  The myth of the national unity in the forthcoming phase could be sermonized in terms of the primary societal institutions of socialization, as it is the example of Family. Nevertheless, in practice the inconstancy of the character in these institutions such as the variable nature equally regarding the physical and ethnical boundaries, will prolong the whole national homogenization up until the first decades on the 20th century. 
Nation’s genesis becomes a fundamental element in its strengthening. Even if there is a fictive past, yet it must be real. This is the reason why the culture continuity is contingent and inessential (Gellner, 1999: 34). Hence, the historical continuity needs to be invented, by creating an antique past that would overcome the effective historical continuity or through semi-fiction or falsification. (Smith, 2000/1: 53)​[1]​. National thinkers attempt to provide an answer of the following questions: what is the nation’s origin, what are the nation’s diacritical features, who belongs and who doesn’t and what is the future of the nation (Brunnbauer, 2004: 165). 
 “Critical markers” such as religion, language and mutual territory does not denote one and the same identity. Therefore there must be a so-called “invention of the tradition”, there must be a creation of “imaginative communities “and there must be “a basic invented myth”. The group needs to own a mutual famous past, divine ancestors, and hard times in the past, etc. Smith does not argue on the significance of the relativistic position of the historical truth and even not about it being irrelevant for the national phenomenon. Clearly, the ability of the national historians to document fables and exploding unsatisfactory fictions is an important element within the sustainable relations amongst past, present and future, to which the national community is being based on (Smith, 2000/1: 55). As for Gellner, the high cultures strive to become the basis of the new nationality when right before the emerge of the nationalism, the religion was tightly defining each underprivileged as an opposite of the privileged ones especially even in times when the underprivileged haven’t got other mutual positive feature (such as the mutual history) (Гелнер, 2001: 107)​[2]​.
Geertz locates the most obvious changes that appear along the process of national constituting within the second and the third phase but the largest part of the far-reaching changes – the ones that change the general direction of the societal evolution- are happening less spectacularly into the first and the fourth phase (Гирц, 2007: 329).​[3]​
I-	Nationalism firstly appears as an expression of resistance towards the foreign ( foreign culture, language, religion etc). This resistance within the industrial society along with the sense for collective destiny with others; creates the collective awareness and contributes to the generating of groups on intellectuals – the ones that consecutively are the first bearers of the nationalism. They strive towards creating political unit and further on towards creating a nation done by the country. 
II-	The euphoria lasts for a certain period after creating the state but after the establishing of the institutional system again the question arise: “Who are we doing such a thing?”
III-	creating the artificial “ we” while there is a defining of the language as an issue during the defining of the nation itself (Ibidem, 330-333)
Within the context of the Balkan nationalism and the building of the collective national awareness, the key role goes to the educational institutions, which through their own curricula are reconstructing the vision for mutual past. In addition to that, the primordial aspect for the organic origin of the nation predominates almost universally, which is primarily based on ethno-linguistic traits of the group. Speaking of the Macedonian historiography, as for Brunbauer, the national discourse is determined by the primordial and essential approach that refers to the national and ethnical identity as something inherited and not a subject of change (Brunbauer, 2004: 188).​[4]​
Hence, even in the Balkan context, the myth or the myths are a product of contemporary times and even of there existed in the preindustrial past yet their significance and symbolic value are considerably changed. National historiographies insist into the search for a more profound historical past in order to solidly place the nation as deeper as possible into the history. Thus, the Greek myth for the origin comes from the amalgam between the Byzantine Christian tradition and the antique past of “ Classical Greece“​[5]​, then the Serbian and Bulgarian example that insist on maintaining the continuity from the legendary medieval Christian  empires, further on the Macedonian historiography creates an image of a synthetic generating of the nation from the ancient  past and medieval Slavic tribes and lastly, the Albanian history which appears with a pure religious and anti-Ottoman feature that attaches a national overtone to the Skenderbeg’s rebellion.  
It is clear that one cannot neglect the era of Enlightenment and National awakening as a significant segment of the historical past, but also attaching an essence as to a natural and necessary process that comes as an outcome of the past but nevertheless vice versa- the past as a product of the reformed conditions of the present. Thus, in practice the national unity is maintained on the basis of referring to the blood relations and the ethnicity in the country less than the commitment and loyalty towards the civil state while which more or less this is being replenished with the usage of mechanisms for coercion and idealistic stimulating. 
Modernism and the creating of the modern state does not negate and supplant the primordialism at once, while the latter appears as dominant especially in conditions on building of the newly-formed  countries. All of this contributes to the phenomenon and strengthening of the nationalism, racism or tribalism and the interstate separation with disputes (Гирц, 2007: 24-28). The increased Primordialism does not present an issue by itself inherited from the past that comes as an obstacle for political, social and economic modernization but a reflection of the first serious (even though still relatively unsuccessful) attempt to realize a modernization of such type. This dialectics, dissimilarly expressed is a general trait of politics of the new states (Ibidem, 29). 
The one towards which the attention needs to be appointed while the influence of the historical curricula within the reconstructing of the memory and tradition of the collectivities, should not be sought  for classical invention of tradition but a final form of a created general awareness through selective interpretation of facts. As for the case of the Balkan nations there are some examples in which the tradition itself is completely invented such as the case with the system of rituals and symbolic manifestations derived from the building of cult towards national monarchies, symbols (flags, hymn etc) or events from more distant ancient or medieval past that were completely erased from the collective memory and to which a new form and significance is being given, all of these in a function of the nation. 
Even though that those examples could be seen to all Balkan nations, as previously mentioned, this is not the one that structures the national core nor dominates into the system of construction the national discourse. Historical facts, events, individuals and symbolic values derived on their own basis in terms of contemporary times, are reshaped on the basis of selective reading regarding facts, events or individuals. For that reason the contemporary national historiographies most often clash battling to establish a monopoly of the national myth. The foreign myth could be experiences as a historical threat regarding the building of the alternative vision of past, and it could further on directly jeopardize the national myth through its direct negation, up until the perception of the sense of jeopardizing in terms of undertaking the values of the myth itself; those values that same as the negativities are equally inseparable in terms of the system of national historiographies. 
Hence, selecting the historical facts, events and individuals can be done in two directions. Such as external selection meaning excluding foreign historical elements regardless of their relevance into the producing if the historical processes. The tendency is clear. By exclusion of the Otherness, the one that is into possession is enraptured often being put into function of the contemporary politics. The second direction is exclusion and selection regarding own historical moments- meaning that the heroic past is created by the modern national historiography through elimination of all events and individuals that cannot merge  into the appointed matrix of history. This selection could be equally motivated by ideological, political, religious, traditional and other reasons. 
The depiction of continuity existence coming from times while creating the nation up to nowadays modernity is replenishing the myth of the origin. The establishing of the connection between the antique and the Middle Ages with the modernity is actually a challenge to which the national history devotes a significant part of its mission.  In addition to that even in conditions of nonexistence of e certain continuity for national self-recognition, the myth for organic origin is being constructed through a search of relation with the distant past in terms of linguistic and historical traits. Much often the variable nature of the Balkan case is being explicated as a foreign national infliction or as a national superiority far into the history of the medieval empires and antique kingdoms. 
As of Smith, proliferation of the invented nations’ traditions is qualified as “state-mania”. According the socio-constructivists nations are socio-politically constructed falsifications, even though fabricated by the cultural engineers which design symbols, mythologies, rituals and histories in order to compete in specifically chosen manner with the mass modern needs. The historical continuity needed to be invented by creating the antique past that overcomes the effective historical continuity or through semi-fiction or by falsification (Smith, 2000/1: 53). Smith does not argue about the essentiality of the relativistic position of the historical truth and likewise for being irrelevant to the national phenomenon as well. Clearly, the ability of the national historians to document fables and exploding unsatisfactory fictions is an important element within the sustainable relations amongst past, present and future, to which the national community is being based on (Ibidem, 55). 
This refers to the models for national constituting and building the nation alone. Namely, within the context of the Balkan up until now for the current scientific thought dominates the assumption that the nations are based on Ethno-linguistic model of existence of the organic settled nations. The basic substantial national element is the language and culture and the territory according to those aspects bears the second denotation. But as long some deepened substantial theoretical analyses are done, the conclusion is different. Beginning from the assumption of Brubaker according to which the French comprehension for nationalism is state-centered and assimilation- oriented and the German one is Volk-centered and differentiating- oriented; therefore, the first one is based on building universal cultural values and the second one is based on organic cultural, linguistic or racial communities. Hence, the second comprehension of nation is ethnocentrically considered and not as a political fact (Brubaker, 1999: 1).​[6]​ Such interpretation of Brubaker could be implemented in the framework of the Balkan historical- national context while there would be two phase differentiated within the national construction: 
1.	First phase includes the French model, using the assimilative power placed on political ground; 
2.	While in the second phase, the sense of ethnicity of the organ nations or ethnos is built, which after the ascertaining will get a tendency to recycle with the next generations.​[7]​ 
 “The nations alone is a culmination of the long past for challenges, sacrifices and devotion. Out of all the other cults, the one for the ancestors is the most legitimate, because they made all that we are now. The heroic past, great men, fame etc are the societal base on which the national idea is rising”. As for Renan, the shared suffering is more important that the shared joy. The first is especially the one that maintains the collective memory for a long time through the history (Smith, 2000/1: 11, 12). 
Collective memory of the national community is consolidated through emphasizing the historical moments of suffering and sacrificing in behalf of the group. The memory of the hard times is used from political subjects of the national present as a mobilizing attribute that is being used in the moments of crisis of the present. Much often in moments of economical crisis, national consolidation is an alternative for sustaining the unity and the order in the society. But, as of the example presented from former Yugoslavia, the exploitation of nationalism into political aims could cause a new national catastrophes, ethnical, religious or group disputes that are hard to be controlled. 
Yet, every Balkan historiography constructs visions for historical past where they were the victims in collective national sense. Thus, the one that the Greek historiography presents as a myth for the refugees after the Greek-Turkish war, then the Bulgarian one has it by the “ injustice” with the preclusion of the “San-Stefan’s Bulgaria”, further on the episodes of the national rebellion such as the massacre at Batak. Furthermore, the Serbian historiography is a collective victim of the “Kosovo Battle” but seemingly the recent history of national defeats related with the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia etc. While the Macedonian historiography focuses to the “Bucharest Peace” since 1913 and its separation of the “Ethno-geographical” whole. But the one that is impressive is that each Balkan nations- states except R. of Turkey place the myth of the “ Turkish slavery” through their national history as a dark, illegitimate part of their past.  
One of the most essential segments while reading the modern histories derives from the relation of the nations- states towards their Ottoman past and their general interpretation of the history. There are two approaches towards the Ottoman heritage of the Balkans: Firstly, it is illegitimate (the myth for the Turkish slavery) and represents a black hole into the history of this region and secondly, the Ottoman heritage is being experienced as a legitimate continuation of the Byzantine tradition (Мазовер, 2003: 19, 20).
The first interpretation is the fundament according to which every official history facts of the Balkan nations- states was built, in which the Ottoman period is only the dark side of their history and this period appears only as an obstacle into the continuity of their medieval and antique kingdoms and modern nations-states. The Orthodox Christian tradition of culture and religion of the Balkan peoples is placed into a function of their perception of the Ottoman past where framed through the religion where a survival of those cultures is provided. The latter is the base for building the national myths as well as the one that is named as “famous history of the ancestors” (Каракасиду, 2002:16). Speaking of which at the same time the fact that there is a perception of the West is used such as “The Balkan and the Adriatic as a final line of control and defense to the Muslim East” (Noris, 1999: 18).​[8]​
The second interpretation is to comprehend the Ottoman heritage as a complex symbiosis of the Turkish, Islam and Byzantine- actually the Balkan tradition. It is based on the logical assumption that the mutual life since few centuries ahead needed to result with a mutual heritage (Тодорова, 2001:241). The Balkan is before all, very important as a western hypostasis of the Ottoman historical heritage, and its significance is increasing or decreasing into one complex and indirect linkage with the refusing or accepting the Ottoman past. This is the case of nowadays especially, when almost in all of the Turkish ideological and political spectra a profound reexamination of the Ataturk republican heritage is being done (Ibidem, 74). Mazover claims that within the desire to become Europeans, the citizens of the Balkan national states ought to deny the legitimacy of the Ottoman past (Мазовер, 2003:21). Thus for example the discrepancies that were imposed to the Christian citizens in Macedonia into the national competition in the beginning of the 20-th century radically violated the dynamics of trade, intercourse and coexistence that were present during the late Ottoman Era (Каракасиду, 2002: 84). 
The Heroic time is completely established into the Christian viewpoint for construction the collective visions for self-sacrificing in behalf of the others. Hence, the heroic time proceeds after “the Golden Age”​[9]​ and is being given an anti-ottoman and anti-Islamic trait”. Even Skanderbeg’s “Albanian” rebellion is being given a Pan-Christian trait in spite the fact that the contemporary historical visions build different image of the national heroism. The rest of the myths are mainly connected with the national liberation movements and rebellions pointed against the Ottoman Empire – First and the Second Serbian Rebellion, Greek  Rebellion and the Battle for Independency, April Uprising in Bulgaria as well as the Ilinden Uprising in Macedonia. Further on, the Nation’s War of the Balkan People during the periods of the Greek and Macedonian Battle, The Balkan Wars, World War One and World War Two as even the Greek Civil War that beside it’s in general ideologically based in practice it grew to be a dispute of the Greek nation – a state with Macedonian minority. 
Late Ottoman Macedonian identity as a complex variable develops clearly from the previous stages of Pan- Ortodoxy and Pan- Slavism, to a clear form of advanced proto- nationalism. The stage of evolution toward pure form of nationalism incorporates both political and ethno-linguistic understanding of collective identification, at first of the protonational elites and later and majority of the population. The first stage id development of political utilization of the term Macedonia and Macedonians as adopted categorization which evolved toward selfidentification.
 In January 1871 the editor of Constantinople newspaper "Macedonia" P. R. Slavejkov, in one newspaper article in the same name will indicate the emergence of the Macedonian question: "Finally, the Macedonian question has in reality been shown in the press. We say finally, because this issue is not new. We heard about it twenty years ago by some from Macedonia. At first the words of these young people received as a joke as a complaint in the middle of our not so serious contention. So we thought we until a year or two years, when new talks with some Macedonians showed us that the work is not only bare words, but thought that many would like to put into life ... Many times we heard from Makedonists that they were not Bulgarians but Macedonians, descendants of ancient Macedonians ... "(Павловски, 2007: 139, 140). Slavejkov clearly locates the emergence of political exploitation of the term Macedonia in the middle of the 19th century. This coincides with the production of maps of Macedonia as a specific area, thus confirming the first and the external recognition of the region and later to its residents by foreign (primarily Western) authors. Localization at the time of such use in relation to the appointment, he rejects the assumption that the name "Macedonia" is imposed by the young Greek state due to the fact that Greek historiography decades later fully incorporated the myth of the "Greek character of the ancient Macedonians."​[10]​ If we know that Western writers intensify presence precisely in the middle of the 19th century, followed by increasing number of Catholic and Protestant missionaries (the perception of Macedonia as a Bible country) and the presence of specific political forces in the Great Powers during the Crimean War, one could assume that the political usage the term "Macedonia" is closely connected and influence derived from the West. Such a conception of space creates the prerequisites of the Macedonian intellectuals and bourgeoisie in the early second half of the 19th century to try to create identity demarcation based on popular speech and dialect, and the main opposition is aimed at accepting the "Eastern Bulgarian dialect" as official language of literacy of "the Bulgarians". 
Later the proto- institutional framework of IMRO- s activity will separate this political definition from “Pan- Slavic Bulgarian” toward supra-church and supra-local and finally toward pure form of ethno-lingustic definition of Macedonian nationality presented in the work of Krste Petkov Misirkov. There for “the Macedonian” is not just evolved from “Slav”, but can be seen as a level of opposition to the second one.     
Similar to Macedonian case, the Turkish and Albanian national projects are produced in relatively late stage of the existence of the Ottoman Empire. The confessional divisions in the framework of the Millets, oppositely of the Christians, offered privileged position of the Muslims. This created situation in which the nationalism as ideology of the reformist Western interests was not gladly accepted by the elites of Muslim population in the Empire. But in the age of Tanzimat there was intention for creation of synthesized ideological framework seen in the Face of Ottomanism, later revised by the reactionists in form of Pan- Islamism, and with final ideological form of pure nationalism (Turkish or Albanian). This last form enable the ethno- linguistic criteria as primary, whit main difference that the Turkish form kept the religious based identity on Muslim ground, and Albanian identity makes effort to diminishes confessional differences and promote ethnicity and newly created high culture based on linguistic character of the group.  
In parallel with reforms Tanzimatot "Ottomanism" as integrating ideology of "new order" promote legal equality of all subjects, regardless of religious affiliations. "It seems that for the people of the age of Tanzimat, the Ottomanism was an ideal for unitary Ottoman nation. In other words, the Ottomanism should be seen as something in between "state-based patriotism and official nationalism" (Adanar, 1998: 235, 236). Yet, the Islamic structure of the state apparatus is transformed into Ottomanism- loyalty to the Sultan. To create common interests and values, leaders of the fin-de-siècle created the idea of ​​Ottoman identity, which would entail the unification of all communities. But whit the reforms of 1856 any non-Muslim community develops its own rules of self definition. According to Berkes they turn into "small non-territorial republics and nations in the initial phase" (Мазовер, 2008: 217). In addition to claims that Ottomanism denoted integrating ideology for all communities speaks the example given from Vezenkov. On the question of one stranger whether he was a Jew, Ahmed Mithad replies: "I am Ottoman. I'm the cleanest Ottoman; I am a Muslim and a Turk. "This suggests that while the "Ottoman" should apply to all, in practice, some were 'more-Ottoman" from the others (Везенков, 2007: 62). 
Panislamism follows the development of Turkish identity, although he does not fully realize himself due to the development of Albanian nationality and Arab liberation movement. Such developments have strengthened the position of those "who in Turkish foundations have seen the salvation of the Ottoman Empire." By Tekin Alp this initiative led to "creation of new language, new literature and new pure Turkish civilization" (Мазовер, 2008: 238, 239). Although the millets are not destroyed, the direction that would lead to the successful modernization of the Ottoman Empire goes towards domination of the Turkish element, especially in the thrust to establish a single official use of Turkish language (Adanar, 1998: 240). The use of Turkish language was imposed in official use in the Empire, but this language is essentially a synthesis of Turkish, Persian and Arabic. This leads to the assumption of a correlation with the functioning of Islamic society in which "people of the Sword," "people of the pen (literature)" and "people of religion (Islam)" is social control layer (Poulton, 1995: 32).​[11]​ The regime of Abdulhamid advocated expanding the education program and public education. The attempts to build a homogeneous state, which is reinforced by a decree of 1894 required the use of demotic language Turkish (without Arabic and Persian influence) in all schools of the Empire (Ibidem,50,51).
Tekin Alp issued so-called Patriotic commandments, which consisted in several statements:
-	Make your names Turkish!
-	Speak Turkish!
-	Mix with Turks! (Мазовер, 2008: 238,239).

But the meaning of the term "Turk", even in the early 20th century was no understood in pure national sense. The term "Turks" has no etymological meaning as nether "Greeks." True Turks are official caste (aftentical Turks from Asia Minor, but also and Cerkez, Levantians and even blacks). "Among these various Muslim elements: Slavs, Asians and Albanians there is no closeness by race. At home they speak their spoken language, and Turkish has been adopted second language. But all are Muslims and they are all "Turks" in a political sense "(Брајлсфорд, 2003: 139, 140). Because of this, the new national creators of social engineering had a task to change the meaning of the provincial-pejorative sense, to a marker of national pride.
In 1881, Shemshedin Sami (Sami Frasheri) in the newspaper Hafta will publish an article in which he writes:

"We were thinking that the term" Ottoman language” was entirely correct, because the term was used only as a title derived from the state on behalf of the family of well-known conquerors, the first Sultans who founded this country. However the language (lisan) and nationality / ethnicity (cisiyet) are older than the mentioned person and the founding of this country. The name of the people (kavim), who speaks this language, it's really "Turks" (Turk), and the name of the language they speak a Turkish language (lisan-I Turki). This name, which is seen as a derogatory term used by people who don’t know as name of the villagers in Anatolia, is the name of a great community (umiet), which should be proud of calling this name"(Bilmez, 2009: 351 ).
From language as an objective criterion for belonging to the "Turkish identity" develops the idea of ​​homeland. Moreover in the 19th century in the pan-Turkish national romantics create a relationship of "race" and "territory", similarly as in other Balkan national examples of creating a synthesis of two models of nation building. It is this synthetic approach, coupled with the traditionalism of religion (Islam) and produced by the charisma of a future cult leader (Mustafa Kemal Ataturk,) which will create a modern Turkish national identity.
Similar to the case of creating Turkish nation, the Albanian example of building national conscience is related to creating collective identity based on the language. But as in the case of Macedonian proto- nationalism the Albanians had to reshape present late Ottoman confessional divisions.  Even today there is prevailing view that in the Albanian ethno-linguistic features are the primary factor in self- defining the group, yet in late Ottoman period the Albanian proto- national elites failed to integrate the various religions in the national collectivity. So, in the late 19-the century the situation in Albania looks the same as in the other parts of the Empire. During this period the Albanian people, though recognized as such by outsiders, in practice did not exist as an integrated community. The primary defining factor was the confession, which was the case even at the time of the creation of the Prizren league and initiatives to create a codified Albanian language. The imposition of Christian dialect of southern Tocks as an official language, by Muslim Gegi was evaluated as an intrusion by "The Kaur (Gjaur)" outsiders. Although relatively early in the 19th century Albanians are recognized as a separate group of foreign outsiders (primarily identified through language and culture), they have declared themselves within the Ottoman context as religious Muslims, Christians, and Latins. It took the late 19th and early 20th century intellectuals intervention series and the "invention of tradition" in order to raise the language as the primary factor identification, and thus to create a proto-national, and then national consciousness and group cohesiveness.​[12]​ 

Epilogue – Slavic Muslim identity discourse 
     The Ottoman state in the late 19th century was none –national Empire, whit medieval characteristics, where the bureaucracy seemed to be the only mutual institution that links, but not integrates many different segments of the population. It is known that the Ottoman Realm did not create the integrated society. Thus the combat for national liberation and creating national countries is not only an entire and radical breakage with the past but a negation of that same past. All of these have made the opportunity to establish the nations to be done in two basic principles such as by the language and the religion (Тодорова, 2001: 240, 241).
Late national projects as the formation of Macedonian, Turkish and Albanian identity in the late Ottoman era had influenced on collective identification of certain bordering groups of Slavs with Muslim religion. On wider Balkan level some of them created separate national entities - The Boshnjacs (or Muslims in Bosnia and Hercegovina), or kept fluid identity influenced by different factors as: ethno- linguistics (Slavic- Serbian, Bulgarian, Macedonian ect.), religion (Islam), even sentimental connection to the pre national imperial past of Ottoman empire, or have tendency to create separate ethnicity on political criteria (the case of Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks) in Bulgaria and Muslim Macedonians (Torbesh) in Macedonia). From the other side manifestation of political and national affiliations of those groups can be motivated and by the power of assimilation determined by religion or various historical sentiments, into Albanian or Turkish communities.   
At the end 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Southeastern Europe did not appear as region denoted with nations-states, and was symbolized with the Orthodoxy and Islam. Therefore the Musllim Millett regardless of the different ethnical and language distinction of the groups Muslim Slavs remained as a part of an undifferentiated discourse of The Otherness. The Mosque was presenting combat against the national awareness of the Muslim people, striving for the universality of the religion as an alone carrier of the collective organizing of the believers. Opposite of that, the Church is the barrier of the national awakening and rebirth, standing as an institutional foundation of the Balkan nations-states (Лиманоски, 1989: 96). 
Collective group identity, of the categories of Muslims with Slavic ethno- linguistic origin begins its establishing together with the process of Islamizing and separating from the main Christian community. On religions bases consequently, the relationship towards the “Other” was built including the one with people from the same linguistic origine. 
Creating nations according the language, with an exception of the Albanians, has been obstructed from the religious aspect maintaining the old separation from the Ottoman Empire. Therefore it was impossible not only to integrate the groups that according the ethnical and linguistic bases differs from one another from the dominant nations within the national country, but it was impossible as well for those groups holding identical language or ethnical bases: Pomaks from Bulgaria, Slav-Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Torbesh” from Macedonia etc. The Christian nations on the Balkans have started to understand each other with the language of nationalism, while their attitude towards the Muslims remained in the domain of the undifferentiated discourse among the religious communities. Conversely on that, the inability of the Muslims to adapt to the national code, practically excluded them from the process of national integrating, so they kept the fluid awareness that for long time after was an image for a Millett-mentality of this area and therefore to the Ottoman heritage (Тодорова, 2001: 260,261).
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^1	  According to Rousseau: “ the first role that we need to follow is the one for the national character. Every population has or should have one, character; if it is lacking we need to start stimulating it. The politics for Renan is not enough. The country as such cannot function solely as a social cemented nor  can the relation among their citizens. It could be provided solely through the “ history” or even more through the historical comprehension and “ the cult of the ancestors” (Smith, 2000/1: 8, 11).
^2	  Each high culture needs a country, an own one, if possible. Not every wild culture can become a high culture and those without a serious perspective to become high culture have a tendency to obey without a fight; they do not give birth to a nationalism (Гелнер, 2001: 75).
^3	  Geertz differentiates four phases  within the development of the nationalism:	First phase- the one in which the nations are being formed and crystallized 	Second phase-when nations triumph 	Third phase- when they are being organized into states	Fourth phase - when after being organized into states become obliged to confirm and stabilize their relations as all the other states therefore regarding the unregulated societies where the origin from (Гирц, 2007: 329-333).
^4	  “ Facts” are organized and the sources interpreted in a manner that would serve as an evidence of the existing of the Macedonian nation. The question about nation and nationalism in the Macedonian Historiography lacks with theoretical basis (Brunnbauer, 2004: 189).
^5	  The Elements of the national narration under the sponsorship of the central government are pulled from the past. Кaras claims that even in the self-aware modern country where the national identity  mainly if formed through school programs ( geography, history, literature and religion), worship of the national monuments, ceremonies on the national holidays, military and civil service, yet there is a transfer of the fundamental tradition (Кaras, 2004: 295).
^6	  Most nations live by mixed territorial models. One territorial political unit could become homogenous only in cases when smothering, expelling or assimilating every non-member of the nation. Their unwillingness to accept the destiny as such could burden the quiet implementation of the national principle (Гелнер, 2001: 7).
^7	  The national unity in being less maintained on the basis of referring to the blood connections and the ethnicity in the country and more on the obligation and loyalty towards the civil state, while more or less it is being replenished with the usage of the mechanisms for coercion and ideological stimuli (Гирц, 2007: 11). 
^8	  This viewpoint is followed with the perception that, excluding Albania, is built by the nations- states in terms of the process of Islamizing as an illegitimate, regardless if this process was done in a violent or peaceful way.  Especially in the 20th century all of the above was used by the Bulgarian state to conduct a coercive re-Christianization of its citizens, while the rest of the nationalisms, the attitude towards the Muslim monolinguals remains as discursive attitude towards the Otherness, equally produced from the Christian non-accepting of the group but as well as from the refusing of the Muslim communities to be integrated into the frame of the national whole.
^9	  An exception is only the constructing of the myths for heroic past of the Antique. But those myths are not vernacularly established and a product of the collective memory, but artificially produced from the institutions in the nations- states. Hence, their mass presence in the Greek state is an evidence for strong institutional presence and usage of the mechanisms of the legitimate coercion, while  in the cases with the rest of the Balkan nations, even though they exist, the extent of such myths is minimal.  It the foreword of the “Shadow of the Balkan”, the Bulgarian poet Pencho Slaveikov writes: “Our folk songs do not pass the border of the 14th century, i.e. they do not signify previous historical events”… In his songs they (the people) have kept the names of a few pre-historical animals, but not the name of any king, for us” (Брејлсфорд, 2003: 171,172). 
^10	  Based on the writings of Slavejkov, Taškovski notes that "non-Slavic" character of ancient Macedonia has contributed to create the impression that the identification of "Slavs of Macedonia" name them self as "Macedonians", which later have supported the Greek propaganda. Taškovski will write: "So these people start to understand and Europe, so their statements that they are Macedonians do not want to pay special attention, believing, as they stood at the Bulgarian nationalists and Russian Slovenofils and that they are spiritually through the years of Greek influence forgot your Slav "Bulgarian" nationality or geographic accepted Macedonian name, which the then-European world was synonymous with "Greek", especially in the blistering debate over the national character of the Macedonian Slavs, Greek nationalists have taken just that naming themselves as Macedonians strongest "proof" that they are "Greeks" (Ташковски, 1967: 9).
^11	  Due to the complexity of language, it remains unavailable for broad Muslim masses and remains monopoly of administrative apparatus. Because of this fact, the Enlightenment has little influence among Muslims, and national project delayed due to lack of mass print culture (Poulton, 1995: 32). Thus the Young Turks are advocates for the introduction of reformed alphabet and a new form of Turkish language, closer to the popular speech.
^12	  An example of a situation in which they were Albanians can be accompanied by an imaginary conversation between Tosca and Gega is described by Faik Konica(Faik Konitza):
"Tosca - I want my brother to teach you Albanian?Gega - What you speak of Tuscan?T - See the book. It s Albanian, listen...G – You are trying to make me "Gjaur" [Christian]T - What nonsense. Learn you’re language; there is nothing wrong with thatG – Gjaur, What are these writings? Go away Gjaur ... "(Puto, 2009: 307-340).
